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D R A F T

Major General Lincoln D. Faurer
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Washington, D.C.

Dear Linc:

Thank you for your letter of August 20th on the handling of intelligence support to the Verification Panel Working Group. My thinking, though stimulated by your comments, leads me to conclude that this is not the time to alter arrangements that were organized by and are responsive to the National Security Council Staff as currently constituted. [Admiral Murphy is aware of this correspondence and concurs in my position.]

INR and DIA views are usually presented to the VPWG by representatives of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, INR and DIA officials often attend VPWG meetings on MBFR matters; INR attends those sessions on SALT and DIA does occasionally. When present, these representatives speak without inhibition. Thus, I do not see that CIA's occupying the DCI's seat at VPWG meetings in any way muzzles INR or DIA.

In the VPWG, the coordination process differs somewhat from that normally used in national intelligence production. The VPWG

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procedures were established by the NSC Staff. Because papers for the VPWG are usually requested with short deadlines from ad hoc groups or from individuals in the SALT or MBFR communities, as a practical matter initial drafts are seldom fully coordinated even within the author's parent organization. In regard to MBFR contributions, for example, the NIO concerned has been unable for many months to resolve the differences between agencies on Warsaw Pact manpower in the NATO Guidelines Area; short deadlines could only be met by a single agency. Coordination of these intelligence sections occurs as the papers move into final form in the VPWG, and I can recall no instance in which differing views were not fully explored before a final paper was forwarded to the Verification Panel for discussion and eventual decision.

With respect to SALT, intelligence contributions in which precoordinated CIA/DIA views are essential (e.g. assessments of US capabilities to monitor various limitations, intelligence relating to compliance issues, and key data to be used by the US Delegation in Geneva) are coordinated outside the direct VPWG process. This system seems clearly compatible with Executive Order 11905 which enables the DCI to use whatever mechanism he chooses to provide intelligence support to the NSC. It therefore does not seem improper to me that CIA is involved in the correlation of Community views at this working group level.

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Turning to your examples of events that have caused ~~DIA~~ concern, it was the DCI's decision to have the VPWG briefed on the preliminary results of the analysis on Backfire's performance. This briefing would have been given, whether the DCI was represented by an NIO or a CIA officer. The "CIA Draft Paper on US Data on Pact Forces" was one of those papers referred to in my description of the VPWG coordination process; it was levied on a specific agency by the NSC Staff with a very short deadline. A copy was sent to DIA before VPWG consideration. In other words, the submission of this paper was standard for the coordination process of the VPWG. Only this first draft was produced and no paper went to the VP proper. Finally, my understanding of the circumstances surrounding the submission of the paper, "The Military Situation: Past, Present, and Future," is that they were considerably more complicated than you have described. I would be happy to discuss these circumstances with you, as well as any other concerns you may still have.

In conclusion, let me thank you for your kind words about the National Intelligence staff and for your implied confidence in the NIOs. I hope to further strengthen the institution, in part by using it in those areas where it can make its greatest contribution.

Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence